Troj/JadMbr-A
Posted: June 12, 2013
Threat Metric
The following fields listed on the Threat Meter containing a specific value, are explained in detail below:
Threat Level: The threat level scale goes from 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest level of severity and 1 is the lowest level of severity. Each specific level is relative to the threat's consistent assessed behaviors collected from SpyHunter's risk assessment model.
Detection Count: The collective number of confirmed and suspected cases of a particular malware threat. The detection count is calculated from infected PCs retrieved from diagnostic and scan log reports generated by SpyHunter.
Volume Count: Similar to the detection count, the Volume Count is specifically based on the number of confirmed and suspected threats infecting systems on a daily basis. High volume counts usually represent a popular threat but may or may not have infected a large number of systems. High detection count threats could lay dormant and have a low volume count. Criteria for Volume Count is relative to a daily detection count.
Trend Path: The Trend Path, utilizing an up arrow, down arrow or equal symbol, represents the level of recent movement of a particular threat. Up arrows represent an increase, down arrows represent a decline and the equal symbol represent no change to a threat's recent movement.
% Impact (Last 7 Days): This demonstrates a 7-day period change in the frequency of a malware threat infecting PCs. The percentage impact correlates directly to the current Trend Path to determine a rise or decline in the percentage.
| Threat Level: | 9/10 |
|---|---|
| Infected PCs: | 28 |
| First Seen: | June 12, 2013 |
|---|---|
| Last Seen: | April 19, 2024 |
| OS(es) Affected: | Windows |
Troj/JadMbr-A is a Trojan and the malicious MBR that is related to the Chinese bootkit Guntior. Guntior, unlike other bootkits that hack the I/O path by placing hooks in the miniport driver, hooks the disk class drivers (disk.sys) IRP_MJ_READ and IRP_MJ_WRITE. This approach is not as deep as placing hooks in the miniport driver. Normally the I/O path taken for an IRP flows from the storage class driver to the port driver which then interfaces with the miniport driver and back. So the miniport driver resides closer to the hardware than the storage class driver. Bootkits place their hooks in the miniport driver to achieve maximum control. Generally, hooking at such levels is done to subvert the attempts of security software to read and write to disk through storage filter drivers. This is to conceal the malicious MBR and instead return a clean view of the MBR when read. The hooks don't actually reside inside the driver that the rootkit downloads but rather in an allocated region of kernel memory.
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